Bremer v. East Greenacres Irrigation Dist. Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 39942 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
2-8-2013
Bremer v. East Greenacres Irrigation Dist.
Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 39942
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.
Recommended Citation
"Bremer v. East Greenacres Irrigation Dist. Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 39942" (2013). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 723.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/723
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
BREMER, LLC., an Idaho limited liability 
company, and KGG PARTNERSHIP, Supreme Court Docket: 39942-2012 
Appellant/Plaintiff, Kootenai County Case No. CVl 1-1921 
vs. 
EAST GREENACRES IRRIGATION 
DISTRICT, 
Respondent/Defendants. 
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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL 
Arthur M. Bistline 
Bistline Law, PLLC 
1423 N. Government Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
Susan P. Weeks 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, PA 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
BREMER, LLC., an Idaho limited liability 
company, andKGG PARTNERSHIP, Supreme Court Docket: 39942-2012 
Appellant/Plaintiff, Kootenai County Case No. CVll-1921 
vs. 
EAST GREENACRES IRRIGATION 
DISTRICT, 
Respondent/Defendants. 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District 
Of the State ofldaho, in and for the County of Kootenai 
Honorable Lansing L. Haynes, Presiding 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL 
Arthur M. Bistline 
Bistline Law, PLLC 
1423 N. Government Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
Susan P. Weeks 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, PA 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. Greenacres conditioned Bremer's use of its system on Bremer's agreement 
to construct the challenged mainline extensions. A material question of fact 
exists whether Greenacres lawfully could require this ofBremer ............................................. l 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Green v. Byers, 16 Idaho 178, 101 P. 79, 80 (1909) ................................................................................. 4, 5 
KMST. LLC v. County o{Ada, 138 Idaho 577, 67 P3.rd 56 (2003) ........................................................... 1, 2 
State ex rel. Winder v. Canyon Vista Family Ltd P'ship, 148 Idaho 718, 729, 228 P.3d 
985, 996 (2010) ......................................................................................................................................... 1 
U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Kuenzli, 134 Idaho 222, 228, 999 P.2d 877, 883 (2000) ......................................... 5 
Statutes 
Idaho Code §43-330A .............................................................................................................................. 2, 3 
11 
1. Greenacres conditioned Bremer's use of its system on Bremer's 
agreement to construct the challenged mainline extensions. A material 
question of fact exists whether Greenacres lawfully could require this of 
Bremer. 
Greenacres attempts to make it look like the challenged line extension was Bremer's idea 
by pointing out that all the submissions from Bremer had the challenged mainline extension. 
"Bremer's engineer provided an engineered proposal to achieve Bremer's objective, and therefor 
it presented a plan for the proper distribution of water." (Respondent's Brief at 20). Greenacres 
even goes as far as to argue that this case falls within KMST. LLC v. County o(Ada, 138 Idaho 
577, 67 P3.rd 56 (2003). KMST holds that, " ... voluntary actions by developers do not 
constitute a taking." State ex rel. Winder v. Canvon Vista F amilv Ltd P 'ship, 148 Idaho 718, 
729, 228 P.3d 985, 996 (2010). Bremer did agree to construct the challenged line extensions, but 
the reason his submissions contained the challenged mainline extensions was because 
Greenacres required it. Greenacres could only lawfully require such a thing if it was necessary 
for the proper distribution of water to Bremer's property. If the challenged mainline extensions 
were not necessary for that purpose, then Bremer' s agreement to install them was the product of 
economic coercion. 1 
The record is clear that Bremer could either shut down his operation or accede to 
Greenacres demand that Bremer construct the challenged line improvement. Greenacres makes 
this point in its response to Bremer's motion for summary judgment; "The District set forth its 
conditions for provision of water to Bremer's parcel, which included the requirement that the 
extension be built to District standards at the owners cost.[ .. ] Bremer could have chosen 
not to move forward with the project." (R. 182). In addition, Gary Bremer testified that his 
1 Greenacres makes the point that Bremer didn't pay it anything to the voluntary payment rule is inapplicable. The 
voluntary payment rule does not require the payment be cash. The "payment" would have been infrastructure 
improvements Greenacres received for free. In any event, the voluntary payment rule is just the flip side of 
economic coercion. Ifit is a voluntary payment, it was not coerced, if it was coerced it was not voluntary. 
1 
hook-up was conditioned on the mainline extensions, (R. 25), Scott Jones testified that various 
representatives of Greenacres informed him that Greenacres was requiring the mainline to be 
extended all the way across the property, (R. 239), and Greenacres moves for summary judgment 
on the grounds that, " ... the provisions of LC. §43-330A through 43-330G that the legislature 
intended that the District would have the power to require landowners who subdivided 
agricultural lands for residential, commercial, industrial or municipal use to pay for the cost of 
extension of a pressurized system." (R. 52). The logic of KMST is not applicable here since the 
challenged mainline extensions were not voluntarily put forth by Bremer, but were a requirement 
of Greenacres in order for Bremer to utilize its water system for his commercial business. There 
is at least a material question of fact as to whether Bremer' s agreement to do so was the product 
of economic coercion. 
Greenacres threatened to withhold water if Bremer did not construct the mainline 
extensions. Greenacres could only lawfully impose this requirement if those extensions were 
necessary " ... for the proper distribution of irrigation water to the parcel or to the designated 
tracts within the parcel," Idaho Code §43-330A.2 There is at least a material question of fact as 
to whether the challenged mainline extensions were required for the proper distribution of water 
to the subject parcel as no evidence is in the record to support such a conclusion. The only 
evidence in the record is to the contrary. 
Greenacres argues that, "Although Bremer advances the untenable position that a water 
main extension was not necessary to serve its new building, all the facts in the record are to the 
contrary." (Respondent's Brief at 1). Bremer is not advancing the position that no mainline 
extensions were necessary, just that the mainline extensions Greenacres exacted from Bremer 
2 Contrary to Greenacres assertion, Bremer does not argue that the failure to comply with Idaho Code §43-330A, et 
seq, invalidates an agreement. Bremer only argues that Greenacres backed into Idaho Code §43-330A after 
Greenacres was sued as is evidenced by a complete lack of compliance with those code sections. 
2 
were not necessary for Bremer's project. Greenacres acknowledges that the subject parcel could 
have been served by an existing main line in its Response Brief. "Bremer notes in its appeal 
brief that Sappington's testimony reveals that the water main serving Bremer's property adjacent 
to McGuire Road could have been extended east across and through Bremer's property to serve 
the new manufacturing building." (Response Brief at 29). Greenacres does not deny the fact 
that a mainline already serving Bremer could have been extended to serve Bremer' s new 
building. Greenacres only argues that Bremer was required to prove that extending the existing 
mainlines was "better" to serve his needs than forcing him to install the challenged mainline 
extensions. The issue was not whether one mainline extension was "better" for serving Bremer' s 
needs and Bremer was not required to prove anything in that regard. The issue was and is 
whether the challenged mainline extensions were necessary for the proper distribution of water 
to Bremer's parcel. Idaho Code §43-330A. 
No evidence exists that the challenged mainlines were necessary for the proper 
distribution of water to Bremer's parcel. The only evidence is that the Greenacres wanted the 
challenged mainline extension completed because it saved Greenacres money, and thus, 
benefitted all users of the system.3 Greenacres prefers to have mainline extension in the public 
right of way whenever possible because it facilitates future distribution system additions and 
extensions by eliminating the need to acquire easements across drive land for extensions of 
the water main and reduces the cost of operation and maintenance ... " (R. 146). Requiring 
Bremer to place the mainline extensions where it did was unrelated to Bremer's use of the 
system. Greenacres provided a benefit for all in the reduction of future costs. No statutory 
authority exists which would allow Greenacres to impose the cost of this infrastructure 
3 This is the hallmark of a "tax". " ... a tax is forced contribution by the public at large to meet public needs 
Potts Const. Co. v. N. Kootenai Water Dist., 141 Idaho 678, 681, 116 P.3d 8, 11 (2005) citing Brewster v. City of 
Pocatello, 15 Idaho 502, 768 P.2d 765 (1988). 
3 
improvement on Bremer because it was for the benefit of all users and not required for the proper 
distribution of water to Bremer' s parcel. 
Greenacres required Bremer to install the challenged mainline extension, and at least a 
material question of fact exists as to whether that extension was required to provide the proper 
distribution to Bremer's parcel. Therefore, a material question of fact exits as to whether 
Bremer's agreement to install those extensions was the product of economic coercion as it is 
undisputed Bremer would suffer severe economic consequences ifhe did not accede to 
Greenacres demand. 
Bremer was faced with the prospect of losing $6,000 per day or acceding to Greenacres 
demands. Greenacres seems to hint that this $6,000 is not supported in the evidence. Gary 
Bremer, the owner of the company, testified to this detail and ifhe had submitted a prospective 
profit and loss, as opposed to his summary, Greenacres would be in no better position to 
challenge the evidence than it is now. Losing the productivity capacity of real property based on 
the denial of access to water has already been found to be economic coercion in the case of 
Green v. Bvers, 16 Idaho 178, 101 P. 79, 80 (1909): 
In the case at bar the respondent avers that the irrigation company 
refused to deliver him any water until he signed said contract, and 
through fear that he would be unable to raise any crops whatever 
on said land if he did not secure the water, and being in immediate 
need of water for the irrigation of said lands, and defendant 
solemnly protesting to the officers and agents of said company 
against signing said contract, he signed it. 
We think that allegation is sufficient to present an issue as to 
whether the defendant was under such fear or duress as would void 
the contract. It clearly indicates that the irrigation company was in 
a position to and did dictate and threaten not to let defendant have 
any water, and that the parties were not at arms' length in the 
making of the contract, and in such cases, where a person is 
influenced to enter into a contract by threats of injury, the courts 
4 
will determine whether the contract was entered into by or through 
wrongful compulsion. 
Green v. Byers, 16 Idaho 178, 101 P. 
79' 80-81 (1909) 
Furthermore, Bremer was required to mitigate his damages caused by Greenacres 
wrongful conduct. This suit was filed March 4, 2011. If Bremer had chosen to let his building 
sit idle and then pursue damages at $6,000 per day, there is no question that Bremer would be 
guilty of failing to mitigate its damages. The costs of the challenged mainline extensions was 
over $80,000, or roughly thirteen (13) days of not operating. "The duty to mitigate, also known 
as the 'doctrine of avoidable consequences,' provides that a plaintiff who is injured by actionable 
conduct of a defendant is ordinarily denied recovery for damages which could have been avoided 
by reasonable acts .... " US Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Kuenzli, 134 Idaho 222, 228, 999 P.2d 877, 883 
(2000) citing Margaret H Wayne Trust v. Lipsky. 123 Idaho 253, 261, 846 P.2d 904, 912 (1993). 
Given that Bremer had the ability to construct the challenged mainline extensions, the only 
reasonable course for him to take would be to construct them and then seek to recoup the cost, 
rather than incur $6,000 in losses per day. 
Greenacres conditioned Bremer's use of its system on Bremer's agreement to construct 
the challenged mainline extensions. This coerced agreement is only legal if it was required for 
the proper distribution of water to Bremer's parcel. A material question of fact exists as to 
whether the challenged mainline extensions were required for the proper distribution of water to 
Bremer' s property, and thus, a material question of fact exists as to whether Bremer' s agreement 
to construct those extensions was the produce of economic coercion. It was error to grant 
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